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Login to watch this video if you have a subscription. Learn more about subscriptions.This presentation is the third part of a three-part series presented by instructor Dr. Jason Dean, Associate Professor of Economics at King’s University College at Western University. Using China’s economic history as its central case study, the series helps legal professionals understand how markets, government planning and economic incentives shape public policy and long-term development.
Course One built a framework for judging economic systems. Course Two applied it to a country that removed a market’s correction mechanisms one at a time. This hour follows the same country switching them back on.
It opens on an experiment nobody designed. Nothing physical about Chinese agriculture changed between 1977 and 1984. The same fields, the same households, the same seed and tools, ordinary weather, no new land, nothing extra from the state. What moved was a rule about who kept output above a fixed quota, and grain production rose from about 305 million tonnes to about 407 million.
The first half follows the sequence that produced that result in the order it happened. Procurement prices rose in 1979, and the number that mattered was not the quota price but the marginal price, which rose 40.7 percent. The household responsibility system arrived from below rather than from above, since the Third Plenum this course dates reform from specifically prohibited household contracting, and eighteen farmers in Anhui signed one anyway. Four special economic zones opened on the southern coast in 1980, chosen for proximity to Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan rather than for existing industry, and produced four different outcomes from identical rules. The dual-track system of 1984 let a planned economy grow into a market one without a single day on which the plan was abolished by freezing the plan in absolute quantity and letting everything above it trade freely.
The course also shows where its own evidence cuts against the simple story. Grain output stalled after 1984 and did not clearly exceed that level until 1990, which is the strongest evidence that the reform delivered a one-time level shift rather than a permanent change in the growth rate. The claim that the dual track created winners without losers is a theoretical result with conditions attached, and the second phase of reform, from 1993, laid off more than 35 million state workers. The widely repeated conclusion that the plan had become immaterial by the late 1980s rests on reading one series from a figure that plots three.
The second half asks why growth has fallen from near ten percent to near five. Two structural engines produced the earlier growth, and both have stopped. Population peaked at the end of 2021, four years before it was projected to, and has fallen every year since at an accelerating rate. Agricultural employment fell from 71 percent of the workforce to 21.7 percent, and the gain from moving another worker off the land depends on a gap and a pool that are both now much smaller. Total factor productivity ran at 3.8 percent a year through the reform era and is estimated at between 0.7 and 2.3 percent since 2010.
The final sections cover material that did not exist when the underlying lectures were written. The property downturn and its fiscal channel through land sale revenue into local government balance sheets. Three years of deflation and why the recent turn in producer prices is not yet a recovery in household demand. China’s position in batteries, solar and electric vehicles, with each share stated against its own denominator. The technology control regime that now constrains it.
Where the official growth figure is disputed, the course gives both numbers and says what would have to be true for each. Where a source could not be verified, the course says so rather than repeating it.
The comparison the series insists on throughout is never markets against an ideal government. It is imperfect markets against imperfect governments, and every mechanism described would have operated identically with entirely decent people in every chair.
Dr. Jason Dean is an economist and Associate Professor in the School of Management, Economics, and Mathematics at King’s University College, as well as an instructor at Wilfrid Laurier University’s Lazaridis School of Business and Economics. He received a BBA from Wilfrid Laurier University, an MA in Economics from the University of Guelph and a PhD in Economics from McGill University. He teaches courses in macroeconomics and microeconomics, applied econometrics and labour economics. His research examines labour-market issues, housing, health, immigration and employment, and his work has appeared in peer-reviewed academic journals.